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Abstract 
This research investigates the impact of deprivation on demographic inequalities in England and 
Wales among adults.  Using demographic measures including the modal age at death, life 
expectancy, lifespan variation and mortality, it shows a negative correlation with deprivation as 
measured by the 2015 Index of Multiple Deprivation. Although it finds that life expectancy is 
increasing overall and the gap between men and women is lessening, improvements are slower 
paced in more deprived areas such that the gap between rich and poor is slowly worsening over 
time.  Men are more adversely impacted by deprivation than women with the gap in period life 
expectancy at age 30 in 2015 between the top and bottom 1% of deprived neighbourhoods at 10.9 
years for men and 8.4 years for women. Between 2001 and 2015 inequalities in male mortality rates 
at age 44 were 4.4 times greater in the most deprived 10% of neighbourhoods than those in the 10% 
least deprived, and were much higher than in intervening deciles. The worst deprivation is 
concentrated in specific areas. For example, in 22 out of 326 English districts 25% or more of 
neighbourhoods are in the most deprived 10% and in 5 districts it is 40% or above.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
For the last century, adult life expectancy in the UK has been growing apace although these 
improvements have not been equally shared between its citizens. These differences appear 
to be correlated with rich and poor areas, urban and rural districts, between genders and 
socio-economic groups.  The research question is to investigate the extent of these 
inequalities and whether they are widening. A key finding is that the gap between areas is 
widening slowly and that it is strongly correlated with deprivation.  
 
The better news is that, based on a range of indicators, most areas are improving but at very 
different speeds. In addition, there are differences between men and women, but male life 
expectancy is slowly catching up with females raising the possibility that they may converge 
after 2030. However, a key concern is that in the most deprived areas male mortality in 
middle age is over four times the mortality in the least deprived areas and higher than that 
of women in similar situations and this is dragging down national averages.  
 
The link between life expectancy and socio-economic variables such as education, income, 
occupation or deprivation is well established in the literature with people in lower socio-
economic groups typically having shorter life expectancy than those in higher socio-
economic subgroups. Much of the research has concentrated on the variation of life 
expectancy and other health outcomes across deprivation subgroups defined using the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation which measures socio-economic circumstances at a small area 
level (Department for Communities and Local Govement, 2015).  
For example, recent official statistics indicate that for the period between 2015 to 2017 the 
gap in period life expectancy at birth between the most deprived decile and least deprived 
decile of the English population sits at 9.3 years for males and 7.5 years for females (Public 
Health England, 2018). Furthermore, Bennett et al. (2015) and Villegas & Haberman (2014) 
have reported that the life expectancy gap has not only widened over the past two decades 
but is also forecasted to continue to widen in the next decades.  
The differences in life expectancy across deprivation groups in England can be explained by 
significant differences in cause-specific mortality. Bennett et al. (2018) have found that in 
2016 deaths rates at every age and from every disease are higher in the most deprived 
areas than in the least deprived ones, with differences in neonatal deaths along with 
inequalities from respiratory diseases, ischaemic heart disease, and lung and digestive 
cancers in working ages, and dementias in older ages being the main contributors to the life 
expectancy gap.  
Along the same lines, Alai, Arnold (-Gaille), Bajekal, & Villegas (2018) argue that to reduce 
social inequalities in life expectancy it is key to target the mortality differential associated 
with circulatory, digestive, and respiratory diseases. Ultimately, mortality differentials can 
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be traced back to differences in the incidence of risk factors. Adults in more deprived areas 
have a higher propensity to smoke, be overweight, and have a poor diet and lack of physical 
exercise (Scholes et al, 2012; Public Health England, 2017).  Moreover, more deprived areas 
tend to have more binge drinking (Fone et al, 2013; Ng Fat et al, 2017), higher prevalence of 
diabetes and raised blood pressure (Scholes et al, 2012) than more affluent ones. If the 
country is to succeed going forward, then health inequalities will remain a strategic 
impediment to this.    
As useful and as familiar as life expectancy is, it suffers from the problem that it only deals 
with average longevity potentially masking other important aspects of inequalities. To get a 
better picture of  longevity differentials, van Raalte, Sasson, & Martikainen (2018) highlight 
the importance of supplementing average longevity metrics with a metric of life span 
variability that can capture the variation in ages at death. This is because less advantaged 
socio-economic groups not only have below average longevity, but also tend to experience a 
wider variability in their lifetimes.   
For instance, for Scottish men, Seaman, Riffe, & Caswell (2019) have found that in 2011 the 
life expectancy at birth in the most deprived quintile was 9% lower than in the least 
deprived quintile, whereas the life span variability (measured using the standard deviation 
of the lifetime) in the most deprived quintile was 21% higher than in the least deprived 
quintile. Such variations are not only disturbing from a health perspective but have many 
implications not least in in terms of financial planning and pension systems (see e.g., van 
Raalte et al (2018) and the recent review of the UK state pension age by the Department for 
Work & Pensions (2017)). 
Mayhew and Smith (2016, 2019) argued that unhealthy lifestyles are the main reason for 
variations in lifespan – causes being poor diet, lack of exercise, smoking and obesity. This is 
because major killers of the last century such as polluted water and air and slums are now 
largely in the past with one or two exceptions such as toxic vehicle emissions. More recent 
data also show that deaths from external causes such as drug misuse, self-harm and suicide 
have now replaced deaths involving motor vehicle incidents (ONS, 2017c). In this research 
we show that deprivation is often the common link, the areas being identifiable from the 
levels of mortality, unhealthy lifestyles and vice versa. 
 
Our contribution to the literature on the relationship between mortality and deprivation in 
this paper is fourfold. First, we contrast how gender inequalities have evolved over time to 
provide a much more rounded as well as detailed picture of mortality rates and age of 
death. We use partial life expectancy to break down whole-life expectancy into small 
segments of the age range to look at inequalities within age brackets over time. We show 
that more men and women that would have expected to die in their 60s now live to their 
70s and more in their 70s live to their 80s and so on with men gradually catching up on 
women within each 10-year age bracket. 
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The choice of start age from which to measure inequalities is important. We concentrate on 
adults age 30+ rather than from birth. Different results are obtained when comparing, for 
example, inequalities at birth with those at some other age due to variations in infant 
mortality, childhood mortality and so on. Given that our focus is on adult inequalities, we 
were keen to avoid the possible confounding effects of infant mortality, but also deaths in 
earlier adult age which tends to be higher for men than women (Kannisto, 2000; Mayhew 
and Smith, 2014).  
 
Second, we present an up to date picture of the relationship between life expectancy and 
deprivation by using the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2015 as our marker of socio-
economic circumstances. This contrasts with previous studies which categorised deprivation 
groups based on less up to date markers such as the 2011 Carstairs score (Bennett et al., 
2015)  and the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation  (Villegas & Haberman, 2014). We also 
measure differences in mortality and lifespan between men and women who are exposed to 
different decile levels of deprivation.  In contrast with previous studies, we also provide a 
more granular picture of inequalities by reporting inequalities at the percentile (centile) 
level and find, for example, that the mortality gradient accelerates within the most deprived 
deciles.  
 
Third, we broaden the understanding of socio-economic inequalities in longevity in England 
by supplementing the standard life expectancy metric with a life span variability metric. To 
the best of our knowledge, we provide one of the first analyses of life span variation by 
deprivation decile and gender in England shedding light on this additional aspect of 
inequality. We undertake this analysis at both the decile and centile levels to ascertain 
greater detail.  Fourth and finally, we supplement our mortality analysis with a discussion on 
the geographical distribution of deprivation in England. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of our 
methodology and a structural plan of the research. Section 3 provides an overview of trends 
in gender inequality based on descriptive measures such as mortality, modal age of death 
and partial life expectancy. Section 4 discusses inequalities due to deprivation, according to 
measures based on life expectancy and lifespan variability at the decile and centile levels. 
Section 5 analyses deprivation by English district and Section 6 discusses our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
Our aim is to analyse the gender, socio-economic and geographical variation of three 
demographic measures - life expectancy, lifespan variation and mortality. To accomplish this 
goal our methodology encompasses three complementary strands of work: (i) gender 
differences in mortality and life expectancy, (ii) deprivation differences in mortality and (iii) 
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the geographical impact of inequalities. These strands of work are summarised in Figure 1 
based on a three- layered approach.  
Deaths by age 
and sex and 
decile
Population by 
age and sex and 
decile
Modal age of 
death
Crude mortality 
rates
Life 
expectancy
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)
Life tables by 
deprivation 
decile and 
percentile
Life 
expectancy
Lifespan Mortality 
rates
Deprivation by 
district and  
neighbourhood
Human 
Mortality 
Database
Partial life 
expectancy
Inequality 
maps
Inputs
Analysis
Outputs
Gender 
inequality
Figure 1: Method and approach. The elements are colour-coded to represent separate 
strands of work. 
Our first strand shown to the right of Figure 1 relates to the analysis for gender inequalities 
and uses life tables available from the Human Mortality Database (HMD, 2017) for the 
period 1950 to 2013 based on England and Wales. Using these data, we apply the methods 
introduced in Mayhew and Smith (2015) to investigate gender differences in life expectancy 
and partial life expectancy at the national level. These measures are primarily descriptive 
but contain details of trends over time and the pace of any improvements. 
Our second strand shown in the central part of Figure 1 is concerned with a demographic 
analysis of the trends in the differences in mortality rates, life expectancy and lifespan 
variation across deprivation deciles based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2015. We 
complement the analysis by deprivation decile with a more granular snapshot of life 
expectancy and life span inequalities at the percentile level. We explain the methodological 
details of these analyses in the next subsections. 
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Finally, in our third strand of work to the left of Figure 1, we identify the geographical 
impact of inequalities at district and neighbourhood level according to their level of 
deprivation.  We are mainly interested in the concentration of deprivation in the most 
deprived neighbourhoods by district. Our primary measure is simply based on the 
percentage of neighbourhoods in each district that fall into the most deprived decile.  In this 
way we are able to capture patterns that might otherwise be obscured by the sheer volume 
of neighbourhoods.   
2.1 Measuring deprivation 
We classify the English population into the socio-economic subgroups using the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2015 which measures socio-economic circumstances for 
geographical areas in England only. Specifically, the geographical unit of analysis is based on 
Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) which we use as a proxy for a neighbourhood.3 There are 
over 30,000 LSOAs in England containing about 1,500 people on average each of which is 
given a deprivation score and rank in the IMD methodology.  
The IMD score of an LSOA is based on a total of 37 separate indicators including income but 
also many others and so it is very representative across a spectrum of influences. These 
indicators are grouped into seven domains, each of which reflects a different aspect of 
deprivation experienced by individuals living in an area – for example, education, health, 
and crime.  Further details about the IMD and its composition can be sourced from the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2015). 
2.2  Modelling mortality by deprivation decile 
The IMD measures relative and not absolute deprivation and so only allows consideration of 
changes in relative positioning. In our case we first adopt the standard convention of 
splitting LSOA’s into deciles, with decile one ("D1") referring to the 10% most deprived areas 
and decile ten ("D10") the 10% least deprived areas.  At the decile level we have obtained 
information on the population size, number of deaths for ages 25 to 89 and years 2001 to 
2015 from the ONS (2017b).  
In order to model and project mortality rates by deprivation decile we use the Three-Way 
Lee-Carter model introduced by Russolillo, Giordano, and Haberman (2011) and used in the 
context of modelling socio-economic mortality differentials by Villegas and Haberman 
(2014).  The Three-Way Lee-Carter model extends the widely used model of Lee and Carter 
(1992) to capture the effect on mortality of a third variable beyond age and sex – in our case 
the effect of deprivation group.  
                                                          
3 Lower Layer Super Output Areas are a geographic hierarchy designed to improve the reporting of small area 
statistics in England and Wales. 
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Let 𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 denote the central death rate at age 𝑥𝑥 in year 𝑡𝑡 for deprivation decile 𝑔𝑔, 𝑔𝑔 ={𝐷𝐷1,𝐷𝐷1, … ,𝐷𝐷10}. Under the Three-Way Lee Carter model, we assume that this central 
death rate is given by log𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  = 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥. 
In this model 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥, 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 and 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥 capture the age and time evolution of mortality in England while 
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 and 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 capture the difference in mortality and mortality evolution across deprivation 
deciles. We estimate the parameter of the model using a Poisson maximum log-likelihood 
approach (see Villegas and Haberman (2014) for further details). 
As in the standard Lee-Carter model, mortality rate projections are obtained by treating 
parameters 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 and 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 as fixed and forecasting the time index 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥 using time series 
techniques. Specifically, we model 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥 using a Random Walk with drift: 
𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥 = 𝑑𝑑 + 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑥𝑥, 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 is a drift term and 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥 is a white noise process. 
2.3 Modelling mortality by deprivation percentile 
In order to measure mortality at the percentile level we have obtained from ONS data on 
the number of deaths (ONS, 2016) and mid-year population estimates (ONS, 2018) by sex, 
age and Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) for year 2015. We have then aggregated these 
data to the IMD 2015 percentile (centile) level to obtain deaths and exposures4 at age 𝑥𝑥 and 
IMD percentile 𝑖𝑖, for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 100, denoted 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  and 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, respectively. 
To construct sex-specific life tables by IMD percentile we use a generalised additive model 
linking log mortality rates to age and deprivation percentile. Specifically, we assume that 
𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∼ Poisson(𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) and that the central death rate at age 𝑥𝑥 in percentile 𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, is given 
by: log𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖)(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥∗) + 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥∗)2, 
where 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑥𝑥∗ are parameters to be estimated and 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖) and 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖) are smooth functions of 
deprivation percentile. For this purpose, we assume that 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖) and 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖) are cubic 
regression splines.  This model specification assumes that log mortality rates follow a 
quadratic form with the mortality rates at different income percentile converging at age 𝑥𝑥∗, 
i.e.,  𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥∗𝑥𝑥 = 𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥∗𝑗𝑗 for every two percentiles  𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. This assumption is consistent with the 
commonly observed decrease of mortality rate differential with rising age. We estimate the 
generalised additive models for men and women separately, using data for ages 30 to 89, 
noting that 89 is the oldest s age for which single year of age populations estimates are 
available from ONS. 
                                                          
4 We take the exposures 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  to be the mid-years population estimates for each percentile in 2015 
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2.4 Life tables, life expectancy and variation in lifespan by deprivation 
As stated in the introduction, since our focus is on adult inequalities we concentrate on 
demographic quantities conditional to surviving to age 30. This is to avoid the possible 
confounding effects of infant mortality and of deaths in early adult age on our analysis. With 
the Three-Way Lee-Carter model and the generalised additive model described in the 
previous two sub sections we can derive deprivation specific central death rates for ages 30 
to 89. However, to be able to compute period life expectancies and other life table related 
quantities, we require one-year probabilities of death beyond age 89 and up to age 110. 
Therefore, to extrapolate death probabilities beyond age 89 we use the quadratic 
differencing formula proposed in Haberman and Renshaw (2009).   
Let 𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥  denote the central death rate at age 𝑥𝑥 and let age 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥 denote the one-year 
probability of dying for someone age 𝑥𝑥. For ages, 30 to 89 we set 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥.  For ages 90,91,…, 110, we follow Haberman and Renshaw (2009) and extrapolate one-year death 
probability along the 𝑥𝑥 axis using the following formula: log 𝑞𝑞89+𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗(𝑗𝑗 + 1),       𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 21, 
with 𝑎𝑎 = log 𝑞𝑞89, 𝑏𝑏 = log 𝑞𝑞89 − log 𝑞𝑞88, 𝑐𝑐 = (log𝑞𝑞110 − 𝑎𝑎 − 21𝑏𝑏)/(20 × 21), and under 
the assumption that 𝑞𝑞110 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒−0.7 = 0.50341.  
Given, the values of 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥 = 30, … , 110 we compute period life expectancy at age 30 as   
𝑒𝑒30 = � 𝑙𝑙30+ℎ 110−30
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 0.5, 
where 𝑙𝑙30 = 1 and 𝑙𝑙30+ℎ = ∏ (1 − 𝑞𝑞30+𝑥𝑥)ℎ𝑥𝑥=1 , ℎ = 1,2, … , 80. 
Finally, and similarly to Mayhew and Smith (2016,2019), we base our quantification of life 
span variation on the difference in years between the age to which 90% of the population 
survive and the age of the top 5% of survivors for people that have attained the age of 30.  
Formally, if 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙  and 𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 denote the ages that satisfy 𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙 = 0.9 and 𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 = 0.05, then the life 
span variation would be given by 𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙. We note that to compute 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙  and 𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢, we assume 
that 𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥 varies linearly between integer ages.  
3. Trends in gender inequality 
 
3.1 Mortality rates 
 
Charts showing distribution or spread in age at death give a visual expression of inequalities 
in lifespan especially the differences between men and women. If everybody died at the 
same age there would be no inequality but this is plainly not the case. Deaths are classified 
by cause of death and whether they are unavoidable or avoidable but the point we wish to 
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draw out in this section is how the pattern has changed over time and whether the gender 
gap is closing or widening.  
 
In a stable population with a constant number of births and deaths, a falling number of 
deaths usually signals an improvement in survivorship and an increase in life expectancy. An 
increase in the number of deaths signals the opposite and a levelling out in life expectancy.  
However, we do not live in a stable population and so reasons for changes in the number of 
deaths from year to year need to be treated circumspectly and mortality rates – deaths per 
thousand population is a better option for showing mortality trends. 
 
Here, we consider both in general terms to be followed by more detailed analysis. However, 
a story that repeats itself is that men are catching up with women but also that the 
improvements are not spread evenly or at all ages. If we take England and Wales, the total 
annual number of deaths regardless of gender has fallen since 1976 from around 560,000 to 
30,000 fewer in 2015. This may not sound like a big difference until it is pointed out that the 
population age 30+ increased from around 27m to 36m over the period.  
 
Figure 2 shows the trend in crude mortality rates and in age standardised mortality rates at 
age 30 by gender based on the observed population and number of deaths from 1963 to 
date.  The crude mortality rates reported in Figure 2 are the simple ratio of deaths and 
population of people over age 30 while the age standardised mortality rates are a weighted 
average of age specific mortality rates with weights derived from the European Standard 
Population (Eurostat, 2013). 5 
 
 As can be seen crude rates increased from 1963 and peaked in the mid-1970s before 
declining and flattening out after 2010. Male rates were consistently higher than female’s 
before 1997 when they were equal for the first time, since when they have tracked each 
other closely. At their peak, crude male mortality rates were 56% higher than today and 
female rates 39% - indicating a huge decline. Similarly, age standardised death rates (ASDRs) 
– which account for the differences in structure of the male and female population – show a 
convergence between male and female mortality with the ASDR of men changing from 
being 59% higher than that of women in 1963 to being only 35% higher in 2015. 
                                                          
5 The European Standard Population (ESP) is an artificial population structure that is used in the weighting of 
mortality or incidence data to produce age-standardised death rates (ASDRs). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2: Crude mortality rates in the 30+ population (a) and Age Standardised Death Rates 
(ASDR) from age 30+ (b) in England and Wales from 1963 to 2015 for men and women. Age 
standardisation is performed using the 2013 European Standard Population 
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3.2 Distribution by age of death 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution in the observed number of deaths by age and gender at two 
snapshots in time 40 years apart – 1975 and 2015.  It can be seen in Figure 3(a) that the 
total number of deaths represented by the areas under the curves was broadly similar in 
1975 regardless of gender. The main difference was in the modal age at death which was 82 
for women and 74 for men.6  
 
Figure 3(b) shows the same distributions in 2015 in which the female modal age at death 
has increased by 7 years from 82 to 89 compared with 1975 and the male modal age at 
death by eleven years 74 to 85 and also fewer male deaths overall. This is clearly a 
significant improvement but an important question is whether age at death has become 
more or less compact, i.e. has the distribution narrowed or not? 
 
(a) 
(b)  
Figure 3: Charts showing the number of observed deaths by age and sex for England and 
Wales in (a) 1975 and (b) 2015 (hatched lines show the modal age at death) 
                                                          
6 The perturbation in both graphs between 50 and 60 in (a) 60 and 70 in (b) can be traced to a reduced number 
of births at the end of the first and second world wars. 
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Table 1 shows three measures of central tendency for each gender - the mode, average, and 
median - and two measures of variability - the standard deviation and inter-quartile range.7  
It shows an increase in all three measures and a widening in variability based on the inter-
quartile range, which is 2.3 years greater for men and 0.1 years for women. The standard 
deviation also widens but the amount is 0.8 years for women and 1.8 years for men.  
 
Men 
Modal 
age 
Average 
age 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
age IQR 
1975 74 70.3 11.4 70.6 15.1 
2015 85 76.5 13.2 78.6 17.4 
(a) 
     
Women 
Modal 
age 
Average 
age 
Standard 
deviation  
Median 
age IQR 
1975 82 75.6 11.9 77.0 15.5 
2015 89 81.4 12.7 83.8 15.4 
(b) 
     Table 1: Measures of central tendency in age at death for men and women in 1975 and 2015 
based on observed deaths (Note: IQR = Inter Quartile Range) 
In combination, the results indicate that there has been a significant postponement in the 
age at death over the period. This has benefited men more than women with whom they 
are catching up, although the variability in age at death remains higher for men than for 
women and so there is still some way to go before equality is achieved. Another notable 
point to make about these charts is that the number of deaths over 100 years of age has 
also increased, a point to which we return below. 
 
3.3 Trends in adult life expectancy by gender  
Historically speaking, as these results indicate, women live longer than men but the 
difference has varied considerably through the last 150 years and was actually narrowest in 
the early 20th century.  The gap reached a peak in 1969 when women aged 30 had a life 
expectancy of 5.7 years longer than men but this has since fallen to 3.5 years (Mayhew and 
Smith, 2014).  
 
Although demographers are in agreement that male and female life expectancy is 
converging, they disagree on the speed of convergence and also differ on the baseline.  
Although the ONS provides more recent data than the HMD, the HMD is available from 1950 
to 2013 but is not broken down by deprivation decile. ONS data does this but is only 
available from 2001 to 2015 and at an England level. 
  
We used HMD life table data to investigate gender differences in adult life expectancy from 
1950 onwards which we then break down to investigate convergence within different age 
                                                          
7 The gap in years between the age at death of the 25th and 75th percentiles of all deaths age 30+. 
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segments.  Figure 4, based on HMD data, shows the trend in period life expectancy at age 30 
from 1950 to 2015 for men and women. To all intents and purposes, the trend has been a 
fairly smooth upward progression (in earlier decades the progress was bumpier due to 
deaths from infectious disease or conflicts). The dotted extrapolation based on a quadratic 
trend using 1950 as a base shows how the trend might continue (See Mayhew and Smith 
(2014)). 
 
 
Figure 4:  A comparison of adult life expectancy at age 30 1950 to 2013 with projections to 
2032 (source: The Human Mortality Database) 
In 1950 female life expectancy in 1950 at age 30 was 44.6 years, 4.1 years higher than for 
men. However, it was not until 1990 that men reached the level that women were at in 
1950 when it was 44.6 years. The length of time it has taken illustrates how difficult it can 
be to close a gap once it has started. Since then improvements have continued and the gap 
has further narrowed confirming that gender equality is well underway. 
 
If the trend continues the gap could disappear altogether after 2032 when life expectancy at 
30 will be around 57.5 years for both genders. In international terms it is noteworthy that 
the current gap is already less than in comparable developed economies such as France, 
Japan, Italy and the US. If gender parity is achieved it would send the signal that there is no 
fundamental biological reason why men should not live as long as women. 
  
However, it can be argued that more recent data are better representative of current trends 
and that the extrapolation is over-optimistic. If a shorter period from 2000 is used, we find 
that the trend is linear and the rate of convergence is slower, such that male life expectancy 
by 2030 would be only 55 years and the male female gap 2.3 years. Hence, whilst we 
observe a trend toward convergence the year of convergence itself is uncertain. Section 4 
investigates the role played by deprivation in this regard.      
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3.4 Trends in partial life expectancy 
Although trends in life expectancy demonstrate gender convergence in life expectancy from 
1970, this effect could be caused by different rates of progress among men and women at 
different ages.  For example, aggregate improvements could be the result of far more 
women living to beyond 100 and fewer men than women dying in their 60s, resulting in the 
same life expectancy but diametrically opposed ageing patterns. 
We use the concept of partial life expectancy to analyse the age groups that are advancing 
most quickly in terms of life expectancy (Mayhew and Smith, 2015). This is simpler than it 
sounds and works as follows. Suppose a person has reached a certain age, 30 say. Partial life 
expectancy measures how many of the next ten years a person will live on average. Since 
this cannot exceed ten years this is the absolute maximum achievable (see Mayhew and 
Smith (2015)).  
We extend this idea to each decade of life. For example, we know that a typical thirty-year 
old can be fairly certain of reaching age 40 and so already has a partial life expectancy close 
to the maximum. However, a woman turning age 70 in say 2016 can expect to live only 8.3 
years of the next ten, and if she reaches 80 only another 5.7 years. For a man it is 7.6 years 
and 4.7 years. The concept holds for other ages as well. 
Because the trends are very regular it is easy to quantify which age groups have peaked and 
those where there is potential for improvement. The improvement ceiling of ten years 
means that it is also technically easier to produce forecasts. As partial life expectancies can 
be calculated separately for both men and women we can measure how much progress is 
being made both by gender and age group as well as the speed of progress. 
The only exception is those aged 100 years for which forecasting partial life expectancy, in 
this case up to 110, is much more difficult. This is because life table data are less reliable for 
this age group since so few attain this age and because statistically the rates of 
improvement are still extremely small and hence harder to project for more than a year or 
two ahead. For these reasons this age group is excluded from the tables and charts that 
follow. 
Tables 2(a) and (b) show partial life expectancy results for men and women at three points 
in time: 2001, 2016 and 2031 at ages 30, 40….90. They show that it has increased at every 
age between 2001 and 2016 and is predicted to increase further still to 2031. They confirm 
for example that men and women reaching age 30 can already expect to reach age 40 with 
relative certainty because they have partial life expectances of 10 years to one decimal 
place.  
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Men 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
2000 9.9 9.8 9.4 8.5 6.2 2.9 0.5 
2016 10.0 10.0 9.5 9.0 7.6 4.7 1.1 
2031 10.0 10.0 9.7 9.4 8.8 7.1 3.1 
(a) 
Women 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
2001 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.0 7.5 4.4 1.0 
2016 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.3 8.3 5.7 1.8 
2031 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.5 9.0 7.4 3.5 
 
 (b)  
Tables 2(a) and (b): Partial life expectancy at ten year intervals for men (a) and women (b) in 
2000, 2016 and 2031 
With partial life expectancies of just less than 10 years, reaching age 50 or 60 is slightly less 
certain than reaching age 40 but is still more certain for women than for men. From age 60 
through to age 90 the prospects of surviving the next ten years fall much more quickly, so 
that a man attaining aged 90 in 2016 can only expect to live just 1.1 years and a women 1.8 
years.  
Because the trends are asymptotic i.e. no curve cannot exceed ten of the next ten years, this 
makes them relatively easy to project forward, so that the overall effect appears as a series 
of waves. This may be seen in Figures 5 (a) and (b) which show how partial life expectancy 
has evolved between 1950 and 2010, in which it is seen to be increasing fastest at older 
ages and slowest where the asymptote is closest to ten years. Particularly noteworthy are 
the improvements seen by men since 1950 at ages 60, 70, 80 and 90. 
The tables show that by 2031 men achieve more or less parity with women by age 60 and so 
are improving at a faster rate, although this is not the case at age 70 when women are 
slightly in front. At age 80 men and women can expect to live another 7.1 and 7.4 years 
respectively which compares with only 2.9 years and 4.4 years in 2001.  Overall it means 
that gender convergence is occurring such that both men and women who would have died 
in their 60s are living to their 70s, more in their 70s living to the 80s and so on.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5(a) and (b): Trends in partial life expectancy at ages 20, 30……90 for men and women 
from 1950 to 2013 with projections to 2040 (source:  Human Mortality Database) 
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As far as we can tell the gains that have occurred will continue although the usual warnings 
apply as with all forecasts. Although women will still live for longer, at least for now, the 
male rate of improvement has been faster notwithstanding the most recent period. For 
example, the charts also show a slight slowdown after 2010 which may or may not be a blip. 
What happens from 100 is still uncertain for the reasons given but if the rate of change is 
slower than it was in the 80s and 90s overall life expectancy overall could start to level out, 
although this might take decades more. 
4. Demographic inequalities due to deprivation 
4.1 Integrating deprivation 
That life expectancy and lifespan are adversely affected by deprivation has been studied for 
well over a century (Charlton and Murphy, 1997). The mechanisms by which this occur are 
based on a complex mix of factors such as low educational attainment, hazardous working 
environments, a lack of social mobility, adverse life styles including the self-inflicted health 
dangers of poor diet, smoking habits, drug abuse etc. which largely reflect individual 
behaviours, but also by ambient exposure to the physically harmful effects of crime, air 
pollution and accidents (Mayhew and Smith, 2019). 
In this section, we focus on the analysis of the impact of deprivation on life expectancy, 
lifespan variation and mortality building on the approach of Villegas and Haberman (2014) 
and of Russolillo et al. (2011). As discussed in Section 2, we use ONS demographic data split 
into IMD deprivation deciles which we then convert into life tables. We compare results at 
three snapshots in time 15 years apart: 2001, 2016 and 2031 and present charts showing 
the long term trends over the period.   
4.2 Male adult life expectancy by deprivation decile 
We begin with life expectancy after which we turn our consideration to changes in lifespan 
variation and mortality. Overall the results reveal that whilst life expectancy continues to 
increase in each decile the gap between the longest and shortest lived is widening rather 
than narrowing. Secondly, for both genders, there is an increasing gradient from the most to 
the least deprived decile but that the largest inter-decile difference is between the two 
most deprived deciles, D1 and D2.  
Starting with men, Table 3 shows that male period life expectancy at age 30 has improved 
over the period from 2001 to 2016 with the England average increasing by 3.1 years from 
47.4 to 50.5 years. However, the gap between D1 and D10 increased from 8 years in 2001 to 
8.6 years in 2016 and is expected to increase further to 8.8 years in 2031. It also shows that 
D1 to D5 have lower life expectancies than the England average as shown in the bottom row 
of the table and that D6 to D10 have higher life expectancies than the average. 
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Male life expectancy at age 
30 by deprivation decile 2001 2016 2031 
Forecast gain(+)/loss(-) 
2016 to 2031 
D1 42.5 45.2 47.9 2.7 
D2 44.3 47.1 49.9 2.7 
D3 45.4 48.5 51.3 2.9 
D4 46.6 49.7 52.6 2.9 
D5 47.4 50.6 53.5 2.9 
D6 48.1 51.3 54.2 3.0 
D7 48.6 51.8 54.7 2.9 
D8 49.1 52.3 55.3 2.9 
D9 49.5 52.9 55.8 2.9 
D10 50.5 53.8 56.7 2.9 
     Gap High –Low 8.0 8.6 8.8 0.3 
     England average 47.4 50.5 53.5 2.9 
Key: All figures in years; D1 = most deprived; D10 = least deprived 
Table3: Trend in male adult life expectancy in years by deprivation decile  
 
Figure 6: Trend in male life expectancy in England: Most and least deprived deciles centred 
on 2016 
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Figure 6 shows the long term trend in life expectancy for the top and bottom deciles and the 
England average for men in chart form. It shows that the trend is upward but the gap is 
widening slightly over time. It is seen that the rate of increase slowed slightly between 2010 
and 2015 due to a slow down in the rate of increase in life expectancy after 2010 but is 
projected to continue its upward trajectory thereafter, albeit is a slightly slower rate than 
between 2001 and 2010.  
4.3 Female adult life expectancy by deprivation decile  
A similar picture applies to women except that the level of inequality is less but in other 
respects the same pattern recurs. Table 4 shows that period life expectancy at age 30 
increased by 3.2 years between 2001 and 2016 from 51.6 to 55.8 years. In the same period, 
the gap in life expectancy between D1 and D10 increased from 5.5 years in 2001 to 6.6 years 
in 2016 and is expected to increase further to 7.3 years in 2031. As might be expected, D1 to 
D5 have lower life expectancies than the England average and that D6 to D10 have higher 
life expectancies. However, disparities are highest between deciles one and two. 
Figure 7 shows the long term trend in life expectancy for the top and bottom deciles and the 
England average for women in chart form.  It is seen that the trend is also upward with the 
gap also widening slightly over time. As for men, the rate of increase slowed slightly 
between 2010 and 2015 due to a slow down in the rate of increase in life expectancy after 
2010 but, as for men, is projected to continue its upward trajectory thereafter.  
Female life expectancy at 
age 30 by deprivation decile 2001 2016 2031 
Forecast gain(+)/loss(-) 
2016 to 2031 
D1 48.2 49.8 51.3 1.5 
D2 49.4 51.2 52.9 1.7 
D3 50.3 52.3 54.2 1.9 
D4 51.1 53.1 55.1 1.9 
D5 51.7 53.7 55.7 1.9 
D6 52.0 54.2 56.3 2.1 
D7 52.4 54.7 56.9 2.1 
D8 52.6 55.0 57.2 2.2 
D9 53.0 55.5 57.8 2.3 
D10 53.8 56.4 58.7 2.3 
     Gap High -Low 5.5 6.6 7.3 0.8 
     England average 51.6 53.8 55.8 2.0 
Key: All figures in years; D1 = most deprived; D10=least deprived 
Table 4: Trends in female adult life expectancy in years by deprivation decile  
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Figure 7: Trend in female life expectancy at age 30 in England: Most and least deprived 
deciles centred on 2016 
4.4 Inequalities in lifespan by deprivation decile  
As useful and as familiar as life expectancy is, it suffers from the problem that it only deals 
with average longevity. This is because it conceals variations around the average that may 
be suppressing important information about other measures of inequality such as lifespan 
variability (e.g. within a country or region with extremes of rich and poor).  
We performed the same analysis for lifespan variation as for life expectancy based on the 
definition set out in Section 2.4. We base our quantification of life span variation on the 
difference in years between the age to which 90% of the population survive and the age of 
the top 5% of survivors for people that have attained the age of 30. The higher the value the 
greater the disparity there is in lifespan with zero indicating perfect equality.  
We choose this measure of lifespan variation over rival measures (e.g., the standard 
deviation of the age at death or the Gini Index) for its simplicity and ease of calculation.8 
Note however that the use of the 90% and 5% cut offs are arbitrary and derived from the 
value of xl based on the corresponding percentiles for any given life table. Our experience is 
that this definition is good at picking up outliers in distributions and is therefore more 
sensitive to variations in deprivation than alternatives such as the inter-quartile range 
(Mayhew and Smith, 2016 and 2019).   
 
                                                          
8 See Mayhew and Smith (2016) for a discussion on alternative measures of life span inequality. 
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Table 5 (a) and (b) shows the decile variation in lifespan for men and women based on this 
approach. They show that, similar to life expectancy, there are significant differences in 
lifespan variation between men and women at either end of the deprivation spectrum. 
However, it can be noted that the trend going forward to 2031 is for a reduction rather than 
an increase in variation as the final columns indicate, which means a narrowing in within 
decile inequality. 
 
In 2016, for example, the variation in male lifespan in 2016 was 32.2 years in 2016. This 
ranged from 38.4 years in D1 to 28.1 years in D10, a difference of 10.3 years.  Although 
differences in lifespan variation within deciles are seen to be getting smaller over time, we 
find that differences between deciles are getting wider.  For example, in D10 the gap is 
reduced by 2.2 years between 2000 and 2031 for men but in D1 it is reduced by only 0.2 
years. The net reduction for the whole country is 1.4 years.  
 
A similar pattern applies in the case of women. The range in their case is from 35.6 years in 
D1 to 26.5 years in D10 in 2016, so the inequality gap between top and bottom deciles is 
smaller than men’s. Their net reduction for the whole country is 1.2 years. Overall we can 
therefore conclude that the reduction in inequalities applies to all levels of deprivation, but 
is proceeding at the fastest rate in the least deprived deciles and at the slowest rate in the 
most deprived.  
 
This subtle difference probably accounts for the perception that inequalities are getting 
worse relatively speaking although in absolute terms they are improving, albeit at a slower 
pace in the poorest areas. Nevertheless, the slow rate of improvement in lifespan variation 
in the more deprived areas shows that inequalities are more entrenched than in the less 
deprived areas which itself is a cause for concern especially in D1. For poorer deciles, it is 
also noteworthy that it is the 90th percentile which is not improving fast enough as opposed 
to the top 5% which is similar among all deciles. This suggests that the divergence in lifespan 
variation between the most deprived and least deprived deciles is driven mainly by the 
difference in the pace of mortality decline at young and middle ages. 
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(a) Men 
 Variation in male lifespan at 
age 30 by deprivation decile 2001 2016 2031 
Forecast gain(+)/loss(-) 
2016 to 2031 
D1 38.1 38.4 38.2 -0.2 
D2 35.8 35.9 35.4 -0.5 
D3 34.7 34.6 33.8 -0.8 
D4 33.8 33.4 32.3 -1.1 
D5 32.6 32.0 30.7 -1.4 
D6 31.8 31.1 29.5 -1.6 
D7 31.0 30.2 28.5 -1.7 
D8 30.5 29.6 27.8 -1.8 
D9 29.9 28.8 26.8 -2.0 
D10 29.4 28.1 25.9 -2.2 
     Gap High -Low 8.7 10.3 12.3 2.0 
     England average 32.7 32.2 30.8 -1.4 
 
(a) Women 
 Variation in female lifespan at 
age 30 by deprivation decile 2001 2016 2031 
Forecast gain(+)/loss(-) 
2016 to 2031 
D1 35.8 35.6 35.2 -0.4 
D2 33.9 33.5 33.0 -0.6 
D3 33.1 32.6 31.8 -0.8 
D4 32.1 31.4 30.4 -1.0 
D5 31.0 30.2 29.0 -1.1 
D6 30.3 29.3 27.9 -1.4 
D7 29.7 28.7 27.1 -1.6 
D8 29.2 28.1 26.4 -1.7 
D9 28.8 27.4 25.6 -1.9 
D10 28.1 26.5 24.4 -2.1 
     Gap High -Low 7.7 9.1 10.9 1.8 
     England average 31.2 30.4 29.1 -1.2 
Key: All figures in years; D1 = most deprived; D10=least deprived 
Table 5 (a) and (b): Tables showing variations in lifespan by deprivation decile (units years)  
 
4.5 Extremities in life expectancy and inequalities in lifespan  
Previous sections identified striking differences in life expectancy and lifespan variation by 
deprivation decile. However, deciles are large groupings, each decile comprising 10% of all 
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LSOAs ranked by level of deprivation.  Within each decile it means that the demographic 
experiences of the populations in some 3,200 LSOAs or neighbourhoods are being averaged, 
so concealing the extremities in the top and bottom 1% of deprived neighbourhoods. 
(a) Life expectancy by deprivation percentile 
To identify these extremities, we derive the same measures at a percentile level – in other 
words we create groupings of LSOAs comprising 1% intervals instead of 10% and then 
repeat the analysis. Figure 8 charts the change in period life expectancy at age 30 in 2015 by 
deprivation percentile for men, women and both genders combined resulting from this 
analysis. 
 
Figure 8 Male and female period life expectancy at age 30 in 2015 in England by deprivation 
percentile 
The percentiles now range from the 1st percentile (most deprived) to 100th percentile (least 
deprived).  For men, life expectancy now ranges from 43.3 years to 54.2 years, a gap of 10.9 
years; for women, it ranges from 48.2 years to 56.6 years, a gap of 8.4 years. It is particularly 
noticeable that men appear to be affected much more by extreme deprivation than women.  
Not only do women have a higher life expectancy than men but the range of difference 
between the most and least deprived percentiles is less by a couple of years.  
The other striking point to make is the difference in mortality at the extremes causing the 
poorest of the poor to have much lower life expectancy. For example, the decrease in life 
expectancy between the 1st and 10th percentiles is somewhat higher than the average 
decrease between adjacent deciles. By contrast life expectancy is boosted between the 90th 
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to 100th percentiles i.e. in the richest areas of the country but not as much as the boost 
between the 1st and 10th percentiles.  
(b) Lifespan variation by deprivation percentile  
We conducted the same analysis at percentile level this time based on lifespan variation. 
These results are shown in Figure 9.  To recap, lifespan variation is based on the difference 
in years between the age to which 90% of the population survive and the age of the top 5% 
of survivors for people that have attained the age of 30. The results again show that the 
variation in range of lifespan is always higher for men than for women.  
For either gender it is highest in the 1st percentile and lowest in the 100th deprivation 
percentile. For men the range is from 26.5 years to 39.7 years, a difference of 13.2 years and 
for women from 24.7 years to 36.3 years, a difference of 11.6 years.  As with life expectancy 
the gender gap in lifespan variation is a minimum in the 100th percentile and a maximum in 
the 1st, indicating that the difference in gender impact of deprivation on lifespan variation is 
inversely correlated with socio-economic conditions.  Furthermore, these results show that 
the most deprived parts of England not only experience shorter life expectancy than the 
least deprived parts, but also experience higher variability in their timing of death.  
 
Figure 9: Variation in lifespan by deprivation percentile 
 
4.6 Relative mortality by deprivation decile  
The results from the preceding sections indicate that deprivation affects both life 
expectancy and the lifespan variations of both genders but men appear to be more 
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disadvantaged than women. None of our measures of inequality so far has been concerned 
directly with differences in mortality rates between deprivation deciles.  
Although adult life expectancy is increasing over the long term and therefore causing 
mortality risk to reduce, we have shown in previous sections that some ‘stickiness’ remains 
in terms of improvements in the poorest deciles which is causing them to fall behind relative 
to other deciles.  
The ‘stickiness’ referred to is the result of higher mortality rates and hence number of 
deaths in early adult and middle-age especially among men but also women. This may be 
seen in Figure 10 (a) which shows the relative mortality rate among men from 2001 to 2015 
by age and deprivation decile from ages 25 to 89.9  
In this chart, the England average is represented by the hatched line so that any decile 
above this line has a higher mortality rate and any below a lower rate. As can be seen the 
difference that stands out most is in D1 for which the mortality rate at age 44 is about 2.3 
times the England average and 4.4 times that of D10.  
From age 44 onward, relative mortality shrinks and starts to converge so that by the time 
men reach age 80 the mortality rate in D1 is only around 1.7 times the rate in D10. Figure 10 
(b) shows the comparable pattern for women. Here, the differences are less pronounced 
with relative mortality at age 40 in D1 being only 1.9 times the England average and 3 times 
the rate seen in D10.  
Both charts confirm the previous findings that men in general are more susceptible to the 
adverse effects of deprivation than women. Of particular interest is the fact the difference 
in the rate between D1 and D2 is consistently higher than the difference between any other 
pair of deciles. In other words, the more extreme the deprivation is, the bigger the mortality 
impact.  
5 Deprivation by English districts 
5.1 Geographical considerations 
The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) which is used to breakdown mortality, lifespan and 
life expectancy is known for every local area of England. Although comparable analyses are 
possible for constituent countries of the UK, it is not possible to join them in a single table 
due to differences in how the index is calculated in each.  
For this reason, we are only able to report on England here. As noted in Section 2.1, the 
English Indices of Deprivation 2015 are based on 37 separate indicators, organised across 
seven distinct domains of deprivation in 34,000 neighbourhoods each with an average of 
                                                          
9 The plotted values correspond to the exponential of parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 in the Three-way Lee-Carter model 
introduced in Section 2.2. 
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1,500 people. These are then combined, using appropriate weights, to calculate the IMD for 
each. With an average of 100 LSOAs per council district the granularity with which it is 
possible to identify pockets of deprivation is very high.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 10 (a) and (b): Relative mortality of men (a) and women (b) in England between 2001 
and 2015 by single year of age and deprivation decile as compared with the England average 
(see dotted line) 
Neighbourhoods can be aggregated into higher level geographies as required making it 
possible to identify whether deprivation in each decile is localised or more common over 
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wider areas. Here we link LSOAs in decile one to the district councils in which they sit for 
ease of identification in terms of the scale of the problems they face.  
For the most part council districts are sub-divisions of counties or metropolitan areas, 
although some counties known as unitary councils are too small to combine all the functions 
of both and so are not sub-divided. We are particularly interested in which districts are most 
affected by deprivation and there are a number of ways to represent this in a map or table.  
We choose to base our definition on the percentage of LSOAs in each district that fall into 
D1, the highest level of deprivation because, as was seen, they have the highest adult 
mortality levels and shortest lives. Our analysis shows that 200 of the 326 district analysed 
have at least one single LSOA in the top decile suggesting that deprivation is fairly 
widespread.  
However, further analysis indicates a more unequal picture with deprivation heavily skewed 
with urban areas in the forefront. We find that among the 22 most deprived districts 25% or 
more LSOAs fall into D1 and of these the top five districts have 40% or more of their LSOAs. 
These districts are Middlesbrough, Knowsley on Merseyside, Kingston-upon-Hull, Liverpool 
and Manchester all in the north of England.  
In London by contrast, only Tower Hamlets, Haringey and Hackney fall into the top 50 by 
rank out of 33 London districts in total, although there are also localised pockets of 
deprivation even among the richest London boroughs. In the bottom 50% of least deprived 
districts, the percentage with LSOAs in decile one is only 2.5% or less.  
The concentration of inequality in England is captured graphically in Figure 11. This shows 
the percentage of LSOAs in decile one versus the percentage of all districts. If the most 
deprived neighbourhoods were spread evenly throughout the country, each district would 
have an even share and the result would be a line at 45 degrees to the origin. 
As is seen, the actual picture is very different and much more unequal with 10% of all 
districts accounting for 50% of all LSOAs in D1 (A) and just 25% for 80% of all LSOAs (B). 
Although at least one deprived neighbourhood in D1 is found in two thirds of all districts, 
the vast majority are concentrated in a relative small number of mainly urban areas. Even in 
Kensington and Chelsea, one of the richest districts in the country but also the location of 
the Grenfell Tower fire (Wikipedia, 2019), 11 out of 103 LSOAs are in D1. 
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Figure 11: Chart showing the degree of concentration of deprived neighbourhoods in English 
districts (Key: A 10% of all districts; B=25% of all districts, C=50% of all districts) 
5.2 Tabulating and mapping deprivation 
Annex A provides a summary table showing the top 80 most deprived districts in England 
based on this measure. This information is also represented in the map shown in Figure 12 
which is a district map of England that has been colour coded according to the percentage 
of LSOAs in D1.  
Overlaid is a 50 km grid to enable the easy identification of specific areas. It shows that 
deprivation is least in districts surrounding London. For example it shows that the popularly 
termed north-south divide starts at around row eight moving northward. The hardest hit 
districts are in the northwest and lie inside rows five and six. These correspond to parts of 
Liverpool, Manchester and neighbouring northern districts like Blackpool and Burnley in 
which well over 20% of communities fall into D1.  
However, as deprivation levels tend to increase in all directions from London, a more 
accurate description might be the southeast-rest-of-country divide. Cities such as 
Birmingham (cell G8) and Stoke (cell G7) and also districts in coastal or estuarine locations 
such as Middlesbrough (cell H3) and Hull (cell J7) also standout as being among the most 
deprived districts in England.   
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 o
f a
ll 
LS
OA
s i
n 
de
cil
e 
on
e
% of all districts
B
C 
A 
29 
 
 
Figure 12: Map showing the percentage of LSOAs falling into decile one (most deprived) in 
English districts 
Additionally, some rural areas are unable to escape deprivation such as Cornwall in cells B12 
to C13, but it is also noteworthy that northern rural areas, principally in rows three and four, 
buck the north-south division. Other areas affected by deprivation are in coastal districts 
including parts of the south and southwest. In Hastings, for example (located on the 
southeast corner of cell J11) over 30% of LSOA are in decile one.  
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6 Discussion 
In previous research, we analysed inequalities in lifespan from the 1870s to the present 
(Mayhew and Smith, 2019).10 We found that these were inversely correlated with life 
expectancy so that as life expectancy improved the gap in lifespan narrowed. This was the 
pattern to 1950, but from then until 1990 the gap in lifespan has been largely unchanged, 
despite further increases in life expectancy. Indeed, after 1990, we found signs of re-
widening, worryingly suggesting that inequalities were growing again. 
In this paper, which is concerned with the impact of deprivation on demographic inequality 
in adults, we found a mixed picture. A positive finding was reducing inequalities between 
men and women, which is a continuation of a pattern starting in the 1970s. Much of the 
gain in male life expectancy is attributable to male smoking reduction (Doll et al, 2004; 
Preston and Wang 2006; Pampel 2006; Murphy and Di Cesare 2012; Mayhew and Smith 
2014; Peters et al 2016) and to changes in male employment patterns away from heavier 
industry.  
This is clearly a welcome trend and will lead, among other things, to fewer years of female 
isolation in later life and longer working lives. However, a second key finding is that these 
improvements are not being equally shared across society or in all areas, echoing the 
findings of some others (e.g. Raleigh and Kiri, 1997; Villegas and Haberman, 2014; Bennet et 
al., 2015). In particular, we find an increasing mortality gradient, and a widening gap in life 
expectancy and lifespan variation, between the poorest and richest areas of England. We 
found that the severest problems occurred in the lowest deprivation centiles and were 
geographically localised.  
Although life expectancy is improving generally, we found that the inter-decile gap between 
the richest and poorest areas was getting wider over time albeit at a slow pace. The adverse 
effects of deprivation were more noticeable in terms of lifespan variation and were 
particularly noticeable among men. For example, the lifespan gap among males in the 
poorest decile D1 is projected to reduce by only 0.2 years from 38.4 years to 38.2 years 
between now and 2031. In the least deprived decile, D10, it will reduce by 2.2 years from 
28.1 years to 25.9 years, so a far greater margin of improvement.  
This suggests that the poorest parts of England are experiencing a double burden of 
inequality, having not only shorter life expectancies than their richer counterparts but also 
facing higher uncertainty in the timing of death. Inequalities on this scale are a much 
debated area of health and social policy but to understand whether they can be closed or 
not it is necessary to step back in time.  Prior to 1950, people died in large numbers from 
                                                          
10 See also:  ‘An investigation into inequalities in adult lifespan’. ILC-UK, London. 
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_details/an_investigation_into_inequalities_in_ad
ult_lifespan 
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infections or accidents, but by 2015 the most common causes of death were from cancer, 
heart conditions or external causes. One exception is death from drug overdoses or self-
harm which have increased and appear to have filled the space once dominated by car 
accidents and which are more prevalent in deprived areas.   
What is driving these patterns and are they set to continue and in addition, if they are set to 
continue, is it possible to influence them in some way?  In addressing this issue, it is 
important to separate gains in life expectancy after 1950. Pre-1940 improvements derived 
from societal changes from which everybody benefited but in different measure i.e. the 
poorest in society closed the gap on the richest which benefited less from their introduction. 
Examples included clean drinking water, improved sanitation, health and safety legislation, 
cleaner air, and affordable housing (Mayhew and Smith, 2019; Charlton and Murphy, 1997)  
The health benefits that are the result pre-dated the big advances in health care with the 
exception of mass vaccination against infectious diseases. Despite huge progress since, 
future advances in health care cannot be relied upon to produce similar reductions in 
inequalities, the implication being that the very big gains achieved are now in the past. As 
ever there will be exceptions, one example being excess mortality from vehicle emissions 
and another is the damage to health caused by shortages of affordable good standard 
housing. 
 A key point is that, today, the causes of ill health are increasingly life-style related and 
rooted in the cultures of different socio-economic groups – these include smoking, excessive 
drinking, drug abuse, mental illness and obesity (Marmot, 2010). For example, recent US 
research (Islami et al, 2017) found that 47.9% of deaths from cancer were attributable to 
avoidable risk factors including cigarettes (33.1%), excess body weight (5.7%) alcohol (4.3%) 
and other factors such as low physical exercise, diet etc (4.8%) (Islami et al, 2017).  
This is not to deny huge improvements in healthy living which are occurring, related for 
example to diet, physical exercise and smoking cessation. The problem is that uptake is very 
uneven. Districts with low life expectancy also have a lower healthy life expectancy such 
that a greater proportion of years are spent in ill health (ONS, 2017a). Sasson (2016), for 
example, argues that wealthier segments of society are better educated on average and so 
are more likely to adopt healthy behaviours, giving smoking cessation as an example.  
In line with this argument, Case and Deaton (2015) have reported a recent significant 
increase in mortality from drug and alcohol poisonings, suicide, and chronic liver diseases 
and cirrhosis among less educated non-Hispanic Americans. The link to UK experience is 
telling because the US does not have a health care system that is free at the point of use 
and yet inequalities are widening in both countries. However, it is not within the scope of 
this research to compare causes and ages of death although this would be an obvious area 
for further research.  
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It is the case that people from deprived backgrounds are also less likely to make social 
progress (Social Mobility Commission, 2017). University educated brighter children from 
poorer backgrounds prefer to seek careers elsewhere rather than returning to their 
communities, thereby perversely perpetuating the cycle. Stayers are less educated and 
more likely to be stuck in their ways thus making it even harder to effect change. Creating 
attractive job opportunities for the young and better-educated in order to retain talent is 
one way to address this.  
The evidence presented here includes the finding that among the 22 most deprived districts 
in England (6.7% of the total), 25% or more neighbourhoods fall into decile one (D1) and of 
these the top five districts have 40% or more. The geographical pattern is well established 
and the reputation of these districts as ‘undesirable places to live’ tends to go before them 
also making many of them unattractive as places to invest in.  However, glibly labelling it ‘a 
north-south divide’ is unhelpful and that a more accurate definition would be ‘southeast-
rest-of-England divide’ with local extremes. 
 If the poorest in society could be made healthier through greater redistribution of available 
heath care resources, the negative health and higher rates of mortality which we observe 
would not exist today but this is plainly not the case (House of Commons, 2009). This 
suggests that skewing resources towards prevention is a better way forward, otherwise 
inequalities will worsen as this research identifies. Clearly, other policy tools aimed at 
changing behaviour using monetary incentives including taxes are needed to steer people 
towards healthy lifestyles, because if they benefit all of society benefits.  
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Annex A: Top 80 ranked English districts according to concentration 
of deprivation based on 2015 IMD 
Deprivation 
rank Local Authority District  
% of LSOAs in  
most deprived 
decile  
Deprivation 
rank Local Authority District  
% of LSOAs in  
most deprived 
decile  
1 Middlesbrough 48.8 41 Sefton 20.1 
2 Knowsley 45.9 42 Sunderland 19.5 
3 Kingston upon Hull 45.2 43 Rotherham 19.2 
4 Liverpool 45.0 44 Haringey 18.6 
5 Manchester 40.8 45 Derby 18.5 
6 Birmingham 39.6 46 Coventry 18.5 
7 Blackpool 38.3 47 Stockton-on-Tees 18.3 
8 Nottingham 33.5 48 Lincoln 17.5 
9 Burnley 33.3 49 Hackney 17.4 
10 Hartlepool 32.8 50 Tameside 17.0 
11 Bradford 32.6 51 Plymouth 16.8 
12 Blackburn with Darwen 30.8 52 Swale 16.5 
13 Hastings 30.2 53 Preston 16.3 
14 Stoke-on-Trent 30.2 54 Peterborough 16.1 
15 North East Lincolnshire 29.2 55 Bristol, City of 16.0 
16 Salford 28.7 56 Tendring 15.7 
17 Rochdale 28.4 57 Torbay 15.7 
18 Pendle 28.1 58 Darlington 15.4 
19 Halton 26.6 59 Calderdale 14.8 
20 Great Yarmouth 26.2 60 East Lindsey 14.8 
21 Wolverhampton 25.9 61 Islington 14.6 
22 Hyndburn 25.0 62 Wakefield 14.4 
23 Leicester 24.0 63 Ipswich 14.1 
24 Tower Hamlets 23.6 64 Westminster 14.1 
25 St. Helens 23.5 65 Telford and Wrekin 13.9 
26 Sheffield 23.5 66 Wigan 13.5 
27 Oldham 22.7 67 Wyre 13.0 
28 Sandwell 22.6 68 Southampton 12.8 
29 Barrow-in-Furness 22.4 69 Gloucester 12.8 
30 Newcastle upon Tyne 22.3 70 Portsmouth 12.8 
31 Leeds 21.8 71 Scarborough 12.7 
32 Barnsley 21.8 72 Waveney 12.3 
33 Redcar and Cleveland 21.6 73 Copeland 12.2 
34 South Tyneside 21.6 74 Ashfield 12.2 
35 Thanet 21.4 75 Southend-on-Sea 12.1 
36 Wirral 21.4 76 Northampton 12.0 
37 Doncaster 20.6 77 Solihull 11.9 
38 Norwich 20.5 78 Gateshead 11.9 
39 Walsall 20.4 79 Allerdale 11.7 
40 Bolton 20.3 80 Lancaster 11.2 
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